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he bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008 
will certainly be featured in history books as 
one of the greatest financial failures so far, 
but it will also be recorded as yet another 
episode of the historically successful performance of 
clearing arrangements in ensuring the resiliency of 
markets. Recognizing the usefulness of safe and sound 
clearing and settlement procedures, the Federal Reserve 
has recently supported the attempt to shift the clearing of 
some contracts to a central counterparty. In this article, 
Cyril Monnet outlines the arguments in favor of central 
counterparty clearing, the economic rationale for trade 
clearing through a central counterparty, and some possible 
limits to the advantages of clearing trades through a 
central counterparty.
Following the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008, 
market participants were worried 
that Lehman’s positions of more 
than $500 billion would take ages to 
unwind. Lehman’s creditors did not 
know whether they would be able to 
recover all of the funds from their 
1 In the 2008 crisis, the Fed also played a 
crucial role by taking on the credit default 
swaps of the insurer AIG. We can only 
speculate on the outcome, had the Fed 
allowed AIG to default on its obligations.
2 A credit default swap (CDS) is an insurance 
contract whereby the buyer receives insurance 
on a credit instrument’s failure to pay — for 
example, a bond or loan — in exchange 
for a series of payments to the seller.
3 See New York Fed, 2008. 
positions with Lehman or whether 
they would have to write them down. 
The uncertainty surrounding the 
unwinding process put the market in 
a frenzy. However, the unwinding of 
Lehman’s positions was concluded in 
the following month. In doing so, the 
major clearinghouses, LCH.Clearnet 
in the UK and DTCC in the U.S., 
restored some market confidence in 
only a few days, after their actions 
made it clear that unwinding Lehman’s 
position would be a smooth process. 
Lehman’s bankruptcy will 
certainly be featured in history 
books as one of the greatest financial 
failures so far, but it will also be 
recorded as yet another episode of the 
historically successful performance 
of clearing arrangements in ensuring 
the resiliency of markets. Clearing 
and settlement systems had previously 
come under severe stress during the 
stock market crash of 1987. However, 
as Ben Bernanke noted about that 
particular crisis, before he was 
appointed Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve, clearing and settlement 
systems, with the help of the Federal 
Reserve, played a pivotal role in easing 
liquidity conditions.1 
Recognizing the usefulness of safe 
and sound clearing and settlement 
procedures, the Federal Reserve has 
recently supported the attempt to shift 
the clearing of some contracts, such 
as credit default swap contracts,2 to a 
central counterparty. In October 2008, 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York stated that setting up a central 
counterparty for credit default swaps 
was one of its priorities for addressing 
both operational and market design 
concerns for over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives.3
To make sense of this policy, we 
need to understand the arguments in 
favor of central counterparty clearing. 
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introducing trade clearing through 
a central counterparty?  How did 
market participants come to use 
central counterparty clearing in the 
first place? And are there limits to the 
advantages of clearing trades through a 
central counterparty?   
THE CLEARING AND 
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
In the 1987 movie “Wall Street,” 
the opening scene shows the trading 
room of an investment bank, and 
the brokers are scrambling for trades. 
Many of the brokers are shouting about 
hot leads and talking on the phone 
to clients, advising them to dump or 
buy certain stocks. The scene, which 
shows both the chaos and drama of 
the trading room, underlines this 
aspect of Wall Street: Brokers can 
make a fortune by just taking a few 
hundredths of cents for each trade they 
conduct. 
But what happens once the 
brokers hang up the phone? Then it is 
time for the much less glamorous world 
of clearing and settlement, also known 
as the back office. And a central 
counterparty (CCP) is one piece of 
the larger clearing and settlement 
puzzle. (See the Glossary of Terms for 
definitions of some of the terminology 
used in this article.) 
To understand where clearing, 
settlement, and CCPs fit into the 
trading process, I will now take 
you through the different stages of 
a typical trade. A series of figures 
will accompany my explanation. For 
simplicity, consider an example with 
three traders: Ace (A), Bull (B), 
and Conservative (C), who wish to 
place bets on the financial viability 
of Direstraits, Inc. (D).  Why do the 
traders want to place these bets? 
Broadly, there are two reasons: Some 
traders may be hedging their exposure 
to Direstraits; for example, one of 
Direstraits’ lenders might want to 
limit its losses in the event of a loan 
default. Other traders may have (or 
believe they have) information about 
Direstraits’ prospects. These traders 
are called speculators because they 
seek to exploit price movements to 
make large gains in a very short time. 
In the first stage, the trading stage, 
all traders agree on the terms of their 
trade. To be concrete, I will use the 
following contract (a simplified credit 
default swap, or CDS): If Direstraits 
goes bankrupt, the CDS seller agrees 
to pay the buyer $5. No seller would 
make this promise for free. I will 
therefore assume that the buyer must 
pay the seller $1 today (the price of 
the contract). Often, it is convenient 
to use the term counterparty when we 
don’t want to be specific about whether 
we’re talking about buyers or sellers. 
For example, Bull is Ace’s counterparty 
and Ace is Bull’s counterparty.
In my example, Ace sells two 
contracts to Bull (Ace agrees to 
pay $10 to Bull if Direstraits goes 
bankrupt), Bull sells four contracts to 
Conservative (Bull agrees to pay $20 
to Conservative if Direstraits goes 
bankrupt), and Conservative sells 
three contracts to Ace (Conservative 
agrees to pay $15 to Ace if Direstraits 
goes bankrupt). It is important to note 
that, at this stage, no cash changes 
hands; negotiation on the terms of the 
contract is all that’s going on. In the 
movie, this is when brokers speak (or 
rather scream) on the phone and write 
their trades on tickets. What do they 
do with these tickets? They send them 
for clearing. 
In the second stage, the clearing 
stage, the terms of the trades (as 
specified on the tickets) are written 
down in three formal contracts that 
Ace, Bull, and Conservative must 
verify. Once the terms are approved, 
the contracts become legally binding. 
The traders can add other clauses, 
such as the obligation to pledge 
collateral. For instance, the contract 
may require a seller to put $1 of 
cash in a margin account for each 
$2 it promises to pay in the event of 
Direstraits’ bankruptcy.
If traders carry out their 
transactions through a CCP, there 
is a third stage: the CCP clearing 
stage. In this stage, the three original 
contracts are being replaced by six new 
contracts. The essential terms of the 
original contracts stay the same, but 
the CCP becomes the buyer to every 
seller and the seller to every buyer (this 
process is also known as novation). 
In our example, if Direstraits goes 
bankrupt, Ace now has to pay $10 
to the CCP, and the CCP has to pay 
$10 to B, etc. The CCP may also add 
clauses, such as an additional collateral 
requirement.   
Finally, at the settlement stage, 
obligations must be executed per the 
agreed terms. Here, cash changes 
hands from the buyer of the contract 
to the seller. Also, in our example, 
settlement occurs if Direstraits 
goes bankrupt during the life of the 
contract. Depending on the contract 
specifications, the settlement stage 
can extend months after the contract 
is cleared. Figure 1 illustrates the 
payments due once the contracts 
are cleared and in the case in which 
Direstraits goes bankrupt, with and 
without CCP clearing. 
CCP clearing is therefore only 
an additional step between clearing 
A central counterparty 
(CCP) is one 
piece of the larger 
clearing and 
settlement puzzle.and settlement. However, this step is 
not without consequences, and the 
next section will explain its use and 
how traders came to introduce CCP 
clearing. 





Trade is at the heart of an 
exchange-based economy. However, 
counterparties to a trade may not 
make their promised payments; goods 
may be of dubious quality or, at worst, 
they may not be delivered. The risk 
that a counterparty will not fulfill its 
end of the contract is called counter-
party risk. As in the example above, I 
will concentrate on counterparty risk 
when Direstraits goes bankrupt.
There are obvious ways to reduce 
these counterparty risks, but they 
cost time and money, and they may 
also limit the choices available to a 
counterparty. One way is to rely on the 
reputation of trading partners. How-
ever, building a reputation takes time, 
and relying on reputation restricts 
competition because it is hard for a 
new entrant without an established 
reputation to compete. Also, reputa-
tion will not guarantee performance by 
a trader that is under enough finan-
cial stress; that is, a trader may be so 
desperate that it doesn’t really have the 
luxury to think about tomorrow.  
A second way to limit counter-
party risk is to impose a collateral 
requirement. Pledging a sufficiently 
large amount of collateral can limit 
counterparty risk or even completely 
eliminate it, if, for instance, the margin 
account covers all future payments. 
Unfortunately, the funds in the margin 
account are not available for other 
investments that might be more profit-
able.4 Also, traders could monitor their 
counterparties, but this requires a lot 
of time and resources.  
Conscious of the importance of 
managing counterparty risk, mar-
ket participants introduced several 
modifications to clearing arrangements 
aimed at reducing counterparty risk in 
the mid to late 19th century. Improve-
ments have occurred  incrementally; 
however, James Moser, in his study, 
outlines three particular steps in the 
historical evolution of clearing and 
settlement mechanisms. While what 
follows is a broad historical description 
based largely on his work, some of the 
earlier and simpler arrangements are 
still used. 
Direct Settlement. The first 
settlement mechanism is direct settle-
ment. This is the most casual method 
of settling trades, since settlement is 
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4 Collateral also involves a significant cost 
(and benefit). As Gary Gorton points out, 
“For the party calling for collateral, collateral 
becomes a form of funding. Because [interest] 
is paid on collateral, firms receiving collateral 
can fund themselves...when issuing debt in 
the market would cost them much more. 
This is one reason that the scramble for 
cash in the form of collateral calls is very 
important. In fact, it is difficult to convey the 
ferocity of the fights over collateral” (p.66).4   Q1  2010 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
limited to the original counterparties. 
An example of direct settlement is 
when you pay cash to buy a newspaper 
at a kiosk. Direct settlement works well 
in that case, because if you can’t pay, 
you don’t get the newspaper (and con-
versely, if you don’t get the newspaper, 
the merchant doesn’t get the money). 
In our trading example, direct settle-
ment is represented in Figure 2. The 
arrows denote the flow of payments 
due, in the case in which Direstraits 
goes bankrupt.  Under our scenario, 
Ace pays $10 to B, and so forth. How-
ever, this assumes everything is going 
according to plan. 
In reality, in the event that Dir-
estraits does go bankrupt, Bull (for ex-
ample) has a choice: Either Bull makes 
the promised payment to C, or Bull 
can choose to default. It is important 
to note here that B’s financial condi-
tion is not part of our simple CDS 
contract. In particular, in our simple 
example, Conservative can’t opt out of 
the contract, even if B’s ability to pay 
deteriorates.
This has several consequences.  
First, C’s expected losses may accumu-
late if B’s financial condition declines. 
Second, Bull might gamble on resur-
rection, that is, take a big risk in the 
slim hope of recovery.  To limit losses, 
the contract may require that Bull 
place money in a margin account with 
C, depending on B’s financial condi-
tion, for example, as measured by its 
credit rating. While collateral limits 
losses, it introduces another problem: 
If Direstraits does not go bankrupt 
during the life of the contract, Con-
servative may be tempted to delay or 
refuse to return B’s collateral. So direct 
settlement is prone to counterparty 
risk, and collateral may not work very 
well with direct settlement. 
Ring Settlement. The second 
mechanism for settling trades is called 
ring settlement. The purpose of a ring 
settlement is to allow multilateral 
netting — that is, the canceling of 
payments of offsetting trades — by ex-
tending the set of counterparties that 
can settle a single contract. 
Let’s see how our traders might 
organize a ring, in which the net 
obligations replace the obligations of 
the original contracts. In the event 
that Direstraits goes bankrupt, Bull 
has promised to pay out $20, and it has 
been promised $10, so its net payment 
is $10. Ace receives a net payment of 
$5 (it promised to pay $10 and has 
been promised $15) and similarly for 
Conservative. Therefore, Bull pays Ace 
and Conservative $5 each (Figure 3). 
Ring settlement requires standard 
or fungible — that is, easily substitut-
able — contracts to allow one mem-
ber to substitute for another. In our 
example, Ace, Bull, and Conservative 
can form a ring, since they all trade 
the same contract (albeit a differ-
ent number of contracts). The main 
benefit of netting is that it reduces the 
cost of open positions and, thus, the 
costs of a counterparty defaulting. If 
Direstraits defaults, Bull has to find 
only $10, while Ace and Conservative 
do not need any cash at all. 
Ring settlement has three main 
drawbacks. First, each member must 
monitor all of the others, since any 
member may be a substitute for the 
original counterparty. Second, since 
ring members may have to monitor 
each other’s positions, traders cannot 
keep their positions secret; that is, 
they cannot trade anonymously. 
This is a problem because revealing 
information about your position allows 
other traders to copy your trades or to 
profit by trading against you. Finally, 
rings can be fragile and susceptible 
to systemic failure, in the sense that 
the failure of one member may cause 
the failure of other members and, in 
To control default risk, 
ring arrangements 
often require traders 
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turn, the collapse of the whole ring 
arrangement. To control default risk, 
ring arrangements often require traders 
to maintain margin requirements. 
Central Counterparty. The final 
settlement mechanism is through a 
CCP, using CCP clearing. To improve 
on the ring, a CCP replaces each 
existing bilateral contract with two 
contracts and becomes the sole 
counterparty (Figure 4). 
CCP clearing preserves trading 
anonymity, since only the CCP knows 
the overall positions of a trader.5 Since 
traders do not reveal their information 
to other traders, they can profitably 
conduct more trade. Therefore, a CCP 
fosters market liquidity. A CCP can 
also foster liquidity by standardizing 
the contracts it clears.6 
The CCP, however, is not immune 
to the failure of one trader to pay at 
the settlement date. For example, 
Bull might not be able to pay $10 
to the CCP when Direstraits goes 
bankrupt, but the CCP still has to 
satisfy its obligation to pay $5 to Ace 
and Conservative. To cover potential 
losses, CCPs use three instruments: 
margin requirements, position limits, 
and default funds. Position limits are 
limits on the number of positions that 
a trader can take.7 A CCP can also use 
default funds. The CCP may require 
traders, before they trade, to pledge 
$2 each to a fund the CCP manages. 
The CCP then has $6 available in 
case Bull does not pay. If Bull pays, 
the CCP returns $3 each to Ace and 
Bull.  As a consequence, traders face 
lower counterparty risk as long as the 
CCP manages its risk well. Another 
advantage of a CCP is to reduce 
monitoring costs. Indeed, contrary to 
the clearing mechanisms previously 
described whereby traders had to 
monitor each other, here only the CCP 
has to monitor traders. 
As in the settlement ring, the 
CCP works best if contracts are 
completely standardized. This is the 
case in our example, since all traders 
make payments in case Direstraits goes 
bankrupt. However, netting is limited 
if contracts are only imperfectly 
substitutable. To see this, suppose 
traders also care about whether 
Endgame, Inc. (E) goes bankrupt. 
In particular, suppose Bull sells two 
CDS to Ace against the event that 
Endgame goes bankrupt (say, Bull 
promises to pay $10 to Ace), while 
other contracts remain in place. When 
the bankruptcies of Direstraits and 
Endgame are not perfectly correlated 
events, a CCP will not be able to fully 
net all positions. 
Netting is not totally excluded, 
even if contracts are imperfect 
substitutes. Rather than the exposure 
itself, the dollar value of the exposures 
can be netted. For instance, if two 
contracts contain obligations in 
different currencies, it is impossible 
to net the two contracts directly. 
However, it is possible to net them 
once the obligations have been 
converted into a single currency. 
This process, however, is left to the 
discretion of the rules governing a 
CCP or in the master agreement of a 
particular industry.8 
Unfortunately, limited netting 
possibilities increase counterparty risk 
for the CCP. If the CCP can net all 
positions, it needs collateral only from 
Bull, who owes $10.9 However, when 
netting is limited, a CCP may have to 
impose larger margin requirements, 
larger contributions to the default 
funds, or stricter position limits.    
Finally, in addition to reducing 
counterparty risk, the CCP can also 
produce useful information for traders 
and can do so without compromising 
anonymity. If all trades have to be 
cleared through the CCP, the CCP has 
access to the specifics of all contracts. 
Therefore, it can gather information 
and release aggregate statistics on the 
price or quantities of the contracts 
traded.  This is valuable because prices 
5 Of course, this requires that the CCP not 
reveal each member’s positions.
6 See the article by Randall Kroszner.


















8 See, for instance, the protocols set forth 
by the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association.
9 Also note that Ace and Conservative are each 
owed $5, so that with full netting, their financial 
condition does not affect counterparty risk. 6   Q1  2010 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
collectively sum up the information 
of all traders. For example, each 
trader may know something about the 
prospect of default by Bull. Someone 
observing a rising price for the credit 
default swaps may infer that traders 
have raised their forecast of the 
likelihood of default.
LIMITS TO CCP CLEARING
CCPs are, however, not immune 
to failing on their obligations: If many 
of its counterparties default, a CCP 
may not have enough resources to 
cover all its positions. In this case, 
a CCP is not financially viable. For 
example, when Lehman Brothers failed 
in September 2008, markets were 
under particular stress. All of Lehman’s 
positions had to be unwound, leaving 
market participants speculating on 
what the outcome would be. Were 
CCPs in jeopardy? Could they cover 
all of their obligations following 
Lehman’s default without tapping 
into their default funds? Fortunately, 
CCPs around the world successfully 
conducted the unwinding process in a 
timely manner. (See The Performance 
of Central Counterparties Clearing 
Following Lehman’s Failure.) Given the 
resilience of markets that operate with 
a CCP, many authorities have recently 
advocated in favor of extending the 
use of CCP clearing to other markets. 
To fully evaluate these proposals, we 
need to take account of the limits of 
CCPs, in particular, the difficulties 
of clearing over-the-counter (OTC) 
trades. 
We can contrast two types of 
markets in which CCP clearing 
can take place: centralized markets 
and OTC markets. In a centralized 
market, contracts are very uniform, 
since the terms (products, quality, and 
settlement date) are fixed, and the 
only missing information to buy or sell 
a contract is its price. 10 All traders 
look at their computer screens to get 
price quotes, and they can buy or sell 
contracts with the push of a button 
(literally), without even knowing the 
identity of the seller or buyer. 
One problem with standardized 
contracts is that they are not tailored 
to the needs of each trader. Traders 
looking for specifically tailored 
contracts will access an OTC market.11 
Since the terms are idiosyncratic, 
traders have to make phone calls or 
send e-mails to other traders to find 
out how much a specific contract costs. 
One drawback of an OTC market is 
that it is not transparent; the terms of 
the contract remain largely undisclosed 
to other participants. The lack of 
transparency impairs the information 
aggregation process that prices would 
normally perform. 
There are two main limits 
to a CCP operating on an OTC 
market. First, Darrell Duffie and 
Haoxiang Zhu, in their study, show 
that multilateral netting is the main 
advantage of a CCP in reducing 
counterparty risk. But as we saw 
earlier, multilateral netting can be 
limited, or even impossible, when the 
contracts traded are not uniform. 
Also, if an OTC trader defaults on 
its promise to pay the CCP, the CCP 
faces a large replacement cost risk. 
The less standardized the contract, 
the larger the cost. To understand this, 
suppose once again that Bull buys a 
CDS from Conservative, but suppose 
the contract specifies that if Direstraits 
goes bankrupt, Conservative should 
pay 10 Swedish krona (and not $10). In 
the unlucky event that Conservative 
himself defaults, the CCP still has 
to fulfill its side of the contract to 
B. Therefore, the CCP has to find 
another trader willing and able to 
provide 10 Swedish krona if Direstraits 
defaults. This may be difficult and 
expensive if the Swedish currency is 
not commonly traded in the U.S. This 
is an example of the replacement cost 
risk that a CCP faces, and the more 
specific a contract is, the higher the 
replacement cost risk will be. 
This is similar to a loss of a hedge 
by a trader. A hedge is a position 
with another trader in order to offset 
the risk originating from an initial 
trade. For example, wheat producers 
can hedge against the fluctuations of 
wheat prices by selling the promise to 
deliver wheat at a given price. If the 
buyer of the hedge fails, sometime 
before the hedge matures but after 
some information on aggregate wheat 
production is revealed, the wheat 
producer may find it impossible to 
convince another trader to buy his 
hedge.   
To cover these costs, a CCP 
operating on an OTC market 
will naturally increase collateral 
requirements and the contributions 
to its default funds. However, the cost 
could be so high, and the collateral 
so costly to pledge, that OTC traders 
known to always fulfill their promises 
(low-risk traders) may reduce their 
trades or simply opt out of the CCP 
clearing arrangement altogether. 
If an OTC trader defaults on its promise to pay 
the CCP, the CCP faces a large replacement 
cost risk.
10 To some extent, the degree of standardization 
is a policy variable, since the government can, 
for example, outlaw or tax nonstandardized 
agreements.
11 See the study by Darrell Duffie, Nicolae 
Garleanu, and Lasse Pedersen, and the one by 
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If only higher risk traders use CCP 
clearing, the CCP may become 
financially unsound, unless it raises its 
collateral requirements, thus deterring 
even more traders from CCP clearing. 
In the end, only very high-risk traders 
may be willing to use the CCP, which 
obviously limits the insurance benefits 
the CCP should provide. Also, if only 
high-risk traders use CCP clearing, the 
aggregate price that the CCP would 
announce would not reflect all trades 
and would therefore limit the diffusion 
of the information. The bottom line 
is that the participation of low-risk 
traders in markets that trade over-
the-counter and use CCP clearing is 
important to ensure that the market is 
efficient and safe. 
In an article with co-authors 
Thorsten Koeppl and Ted Temzelides, I 
examine one solution to the problem of 
inducing low-risk traders to participate 
in CCP clearing. Clearly, they will 
participate only if the costs of using 
CCP clearing are sufficiently low. To 
reduce the cost incurred by low-risk 
traders, a CCP can either limit the 
participation of high-risk traders — for 
s reported in the Bank of England’s 
Financial Stability Report (October 
2008), the London-based clearinghouse 
LCH.Clearnet was exposed, through 
Lehman’s interest rate swap portfolio, to 
the risk of sharp market movements across a wide range 
of products. Indeed, the total notional value of the 
portfolio was $9 trillion, encompassing a total of 66,390 
trades across five major currencies. The unwinding 
process was achieved through the competitive auctioning 
of the Lehman OTC interest rate swap portfolio.  The 
default was managed well within the margins posted by 
Lehman, and LCH.Clearnet did not have to resort to its 
default fund.  
The Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation 
(DTCC), the largest clearing agent for the U.S., 
announced in October 2008 that it had successfully 
closed out over $500 billion in market participants’ 
exposure from the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. The 
unwinding process was carried out by netting Lehman’s 
positions and liquidating any remaining positions, by asset 
class. The largest of Lehman’s positions was in securities 
based on mortgages, amounting to $329 billion. DTCC’s 
Fixed Income Clearing Corporation (FICC) had plans to 
launch a CCP that could net mortgage-backed securities. 
Although it was not in operation at the time of Lehman’s 
bankruptcy, the FICC put the idea to work and netted 
out $300 billion in Lehman trades related to mortgage-
backed securities, or 90 percent of the outstanding value.    
Lehman also held trades for $190 billion in 
government securities and $5.85 billion in equities, 
municipal bonds, and corporate debt. Subsidiaries of 
DTCC processed $3.8 billion in options exercises and 
assignments that were expiring and arranged for the 
release of $1.9 billion in securities with Lehman’s bank to 
satisfy Lehman’s open trades. The remaining positions 
were liquidated in the market. The unwinding process 
was therefore conducted swiftly and without resorting to 
DTCC’s subsidiaries’ default funds.*
Lehman's bankruptcy also highlights the role of 
information anchor that a clearing agent can play for 
OTC markets. With Lehman's bankruptcy, market 
participants speculated that the CDS market had 
exposure of as much as $400 billion for payments on a 
Lehman default. However, as DTCC announced in a 
press release on October 11, 2008, the payment 
calculations performed by the DTCC Trade Information 
Warehouse relating to the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy 
indicated that the net fund transfers from net sellers of 
protection to net buyers of protection were expected to be 
in the range of $6 billion. At the end of the unwinding 
process, DTCC calculated and bilaterally netted all 
amounts due on credit default swaps written on Lehman 
for $72 billion. This resulted in approximately $5.2 billion 
owed from net sellers of protection on Lehman to net 
buyers of protection.
                                                  
                      
A
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example, through stringent position 
limits — or shift the cost elsewhere. 
Therefore, the CCP has to use another 
source of finance to keep contributions 
to the default fund and margin 
requirements low and position limits 
relatively high. 
The CCP can achieve this by 
establishing CCP clearing that is 
common to both centralized and OTC 
markets. Suppose the CCP operates in 
both an OTC market and a centralized 
market in which traders must clear 
through the CCP. Then the CCP could 
increase the default fund contributions 
of traders in the centralized market 
and use it to finance a lower default 
fund for OTC market trades. The 
fund’s contributions for OTC traders 
can be adjusted so that they are willing 
to clear through the CCP. While this 
hurts traders on centralized exchanges, 
one has to recognize that many 
participants are active in both types 
of markets, so that the overall gains 
from introducing a single CCP clearing 
arrangement can be positive. 
For example, according to our 
analysis, it may be most efficient for a 
clearinghouse to clear both CDS index 
swaps,12 which are standardized and 
could easily be traded on a centralized 
exchange, and bespoke CDS, which 
are very idiosyncratic. Collateral 
requirements or default funds might be 
set somewhat higher for those trading 
index swaps so that they can be set 
lower for those trading bespoke CDS.
To summarize, a CCP operating 
in several markets could subsidize its 
risk management activities in the OTC 
market using its clearing activities 
conducted in a centralized market. 
In the end, this could induce low-
risk traders to participate in the CCP 
clearing arrangement in the OTC 
market 
CONCLUSION
Given the large growth in trades 
of credit default swap contracts in 
the last decade, regulators and some 
market participants have pressed for 
the establishment of CCP clearing 
in this market. In the last year or so, 
considerable progress has been made, 
and industry participants have taken 
a number of steps: Multiple CDS CCP 
platforms are now close to starting or 
have already started operations. For 
example, NYSE Euronext through 
Liffe’s BClear platform has been 
operating in Europe since October 
2008. ICE Clear US has been clearing 
agricultural swap contracts since 
February 2009, and in March 2009, 
the Fed approved its application to 
become a member of the Federal 
Reserve System, which moves it a step 
closer to operating as a CCP for CDS 
transactions. Also in March 2009, 
CME Group and its associated joint 
venture, CMDX, announced that they 
have received regulatory approvals 
from the Federal Reserve and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
for clearing and trading credit default 
swaps through CME Clearing and 
the CMDX platform. Finally, Swiss-
German futures exchange Eurex is also 
planning to launch a CCP for CDS in 
Europe. 
In April 2009, at a meeting 
hosted by the New York Fed, market 
participants also supported broadening 
the use of CDS CCPs to include a 
wider set of firms and CDS products. 
They also agreed to report all CDS 
trades not cleared through a CCP 
to a central trade repository. CCPs 
and their members agreed to release 
information about their activities 
as they go live. In November 2008, 
the Depository Trust and Clearing 
Corporation began releasing weekly 
data about aggregate volume on the 
CDS market.
I have tried to shed light on 
the economic forces that lead to 
CCP clearing and, to some extent, 
explain the recent push toward the 
establishment of CCP clearing in CDS 
markets. I have also highlighted some 
of the difficulties of CCPs for OTC 
markets. Despite the clear benefits 
of CCP clearing, it is not obvious 
that this clearing arrangement fits all 
financial instruments. Some degree 
of uniformity in traders’ risk profile 
and instruments appears to be needed 
to extract all of the benefits of CCP 
clearing. Whether we will observe a 
specialization of CCPs in clearing only 
a certain kind of trade remains to be 
seen.  B R
12 In contrast to a simple CDS, a CDS index 
swap gives insurance on a fixed basket of 
credit entities. In a simple CDS, the buyer gets 
insurance on any credit entity of his choice. 
A CDS index swap is therefore a much more 
standardized product than a plain CDS.   Business Review  Q1  2010   9 www.philadelphiafed.org
The Bank for International Settlements, an international organization that fosters communication and cooperation 
among central banks, has explained a number of terms relevant to central counterparty clearing arrangements. The 
glossary has been published by the BIS’ Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and can be found at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss00b.htm. 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Central counterparty (CCP): an entity that is the buyer to 
every seller and the seller to every buyer of a specified set 
of contracts, e.g., those executed on a particular exchange 
or exchanges.
Clearing: the process of transmitting, reconciling, and, 
in some cases, confirming payment orders or security 
transfer instructions prior to settlement, possibly 
including netting and the establishment of final positions 
for settlement. Sometimes the term is used (imprecisely) 
to include settlement.
Counterparty: the opposite party to a financial 
transaction, such as a securities trade or swap agreement.
Default funds (also called Loss-sharing pools): cash, 
securities, or possibly other assets that are provided by 
the participants in advance and are held by the system 
to ensure that commitments arising from loss-sharing 
agreements can be met.
Margin: margin has at least two meanings. In the futures/
commodity markets, margin is a good faith deposit (of 
money, securities, or other financial instruments) required 
by the futures clearing system to ensure performance. In 
the equities markets, margin is a sum of money deposited 
by a customer when borrowing money from a broker to 
purchase shares. The money deposited with the broker is 
the difference between the purchase value of the shares 
and the collateral value of the shares.
Netting: an agreed offsetting of positions or obligations 
by trading partners or participants. The netting reduces 
a large number of individual positions or obligations to 
a smaller number of obligations or positions. Netting 
may take several forms that have varying degrees of legal 
enforceability in the event of default of one of the parties.
Master agreement: an agreement that sets forth the 
standard terms and conditions applicable to all or a 
defined subset of transactions that the parties may 
enter into from time to time, including the terms and 
conditions for closeout netting.
Multilateral netting: an arrangement among three or more 
parties to net their obligations. The obligations covered 
by the arrangement may arise from financial contracts, 
transfers, or both.
Novation: satisfaction and discharge of existing 
contractual obligations by means of their replacement by 
new obligations (whose effect, for example, is to replace 
gross with net payment obligations). The parties to the 
new obligations may be the same as those to the existing 
obligations or, in the context of some clearinghouse 
arrangements, there may additionally be substitution of 
parties.
Position limit: a restriction on the number of contracts or 
share of a contract’s open interest that a single entity may 
hold.
Settlement: an act that discharges obligations in respect to 
funds or securities transfers between two or more parties.REFERENCES
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